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Abstract 
 Propositional models of associative learning postulate that the behavioral impact of 
regularities in the presence of two events is mediated by the formation of propositions about 
the relation between these events. Because the mere statistical contingency between events 
often does not provide enough information to infer the nature of the relation between those 
events (e.g., whether one event is a cause or an effect of the other event), it is likely that 
people will take into account relational information that is provided by the context when 
forming propositions about the relation between events. Hence, propositional models predict 
that contextual cues which provide relational information can moderate associative learning. 
The present paper provides a brief review of several studies that support this prediction. 
These findings contribute not only to the cognitive literature on the mental mechanisms that 
mediate associative learning but also to the functional literature on associative learning by 
providing novel evidence for arbitrarily applicable relational responding. Vice versa, 
functional research on relational responding can provide a new source of information for the 
development of cognitive theories of associative learning.  
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A Propositional Perspective on Context Effects in Human Associative Learning 
Associative learning can be defined as a change in behavior that is due to a regularity 
in the presence of two events (De Houwer, Barnes-Holmes, & Moors, 2013). The observed 
change in behavior, however, depends not only on the nature of the events or the regularity 
that binds them but also on the context in which the events occur. From a functional-
cognitive perspective on learning (De Houwer, 2011; De Houwer et al., 2013), knowledge 
about how the context moderates associative learning not only provides important functional 
knowledge about the conditions under which regularities in the environment lead to changes 
in behavior, it also constrains cognitive theories about the mental processes that mediate the 
impact of regularities on behavior. The aim of these cognitive theories is twofold: (a) to 
account for existing functional knowledge about associative learning (i.e., their heuristic 
function); (b) to generate novel predictions about the conditions under which associative 
learning occurs (i.e., their predictive function; De Houwer et al., 2013). Hence, functional 
knowledge about (context and other effects in) associative learning provides the knowledge 
base with which cognitive theories can be evaluated.  
During the past forty years or so, most cognitive theories of associative learning 
centered on the idea of association formation. According to association formation theories, 
regularities in the presence of two events can result in the formation of an association 
between the mental representations of those events. Once this association has been formed, 
the presence of one event not only activates the representation of this event but also the 
representation of the other event, which in its turn can lead to a change in behavior (e.g., 
Dickinson, 2012). Hence, associations can be conceived of as hypothetical mental structures 
akin to wires or tubes via which activation can spread between mental representations 
(Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009).  
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Recently, my colleagues and I proposed that associative learning in humans is 
mediated by the formation of propositions rather than associations (De Houwer, 2009; 
Mitchell et al., 2009). Propositions can be conceived of as informational units in memory that 
encode statements about the world. Importantly, propositions about relations between events 
in the world can refer not only to the events themselves but also to how those events are 
related. Hence, there are two fundamental differences between associations and propositions: 
(a) only propositions can be true or false (because only propositions are statements whereas 
associations are structures) and (b) only propositions specify information about how events 
are related (see Lagnado, Waldmann, Hagmayer, & Sloman, 2007, for an excellent discussion 
of this issue).  
In the present paper, I focus on the second unique aspect of propositions and discuss 
its implications for research on context effects in associative learning. In a first section, I 
briefly explain why, from the perspective of propositional models, context can be a crucial 
moderator of associative learning. In the second section, I review a number of recent studies 
that reveal an impact of contextual relational information on associative learning. Whereas 
the arguments put forward in the first two sections originate from the cognitive literature on 
associative learning and are formulated in terms that are part of that literature (e.g., 
information, formation of propositions), in the third section I attempt to link cognitive 
research on the role of contextual relational information to phenomena that have been 
documented in the functional literature. More specifically, I argue that the cognitive studies 
that are summarized in Section 2 provide new evidence for the functional phenomenon of 
(arbitrarily applicable) relational responding. This novel perspective highlights a common 
ground that allows for mutually supportive interactions between functional and cognitive 
learning researchers.  
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Context is Vital for the Formation of Propositions 
 Regularities in the presence of two events most often do not contain enough 
information to determine the way in which those events are related. Consider the following 
example (Lagnado et al., 2007; Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992): A patient is treated in hospital 
for a mysterious disease X. The doctor in charge asks for a blood test which shows that the 
patient has a particular chemical substance Y in his blood. Based on the mere co-occurrence 
of disease X and substance Y, it is not possible to determine how the two are related. For 
instance, substance Y might be the cause of disease X or it might be an effect of disease X. 
Knowing how disease X and substance Y are related is, however, vital for determining the 
action that the doctor should take: If substance Y is the cause of disease X, then the patient 
might be cured by removing substance Y from the blood. If substance Y is an effect of 
disease X, such a course of action would have little effect on the disease.  
 Because (a) it can be important to determine how events are related and (b) the 
statistical regularity between events often does not provide enough information to determine 
the nature of the relation between events, it makes sense to assume that people will use 
whatever information is available in the context that can help them determine how events in 
the world are related. Contextual relational information might be provided not only by 
contextual cues that are present simultaneously with the paired events (e.g., another stimulus 
that might cause the presence of substance Y) but also by events and regularities in the past 
(e.g., prior experiences with other chemical substances as causes or effects of diseases). If  
the context (and more specifically, elements of the context that provide relational 
information) plays a vital role in the formation of propositions, and if human associative 
learning is mediated by the formation of propositions about the relation between events, then 
it follows that human associative learning can be moderated by aspects of the context that 
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provide information about the nature of the relation between events. Evidence in line with 
this prediction has been obtained in a number of studies that are summarized in the next 
section.  
Empirical Evidence 
 In the cognitive literature on the effects of contextual relational information, one can 
distinguish two lines of research based on the elements in the context that carry the relational 
information. In a first set of studies, relational information was implied by regularities 
between filler stimuli that were intermixed with target stimuli. In the second set of studies, 
relational information was provided by verbal instructions. The review is not meant to be 
exhaustive (e.g., see, for instance, De Houwer, Beckers, & Glautier, 2002, Waldmann, 2000, 
and Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992, for other relevant studies) but merely aims to illustrate 
some of the relevant findings.  
Other Regularities as a Context  
 Shanks and Darby (1998, Experiment 2) showed participants a series of (fictitious) 
allergy tests that had been administrated to a group of patients with identical food-allergies. 
Each test record specified the type(s) of food that a patient had eaten. After inspecting a test 
record, participants predicted whether the patient would show an allergic reaction. On 
training trials, feedback was given about whether the prediction was correct. During these 
training trials, different filler cues (i.e., types of food) were presented both in isolation and in 
compound with another cue. For some filler cues, the relation with the outcome (i.e., allergic 
reaction present or absent) followed a positive patterning design (i.e., A+, B+, AB-, E+, F+, 
EF-) whereas for others filler cues, it followed a negative patterning design (i.e., C-, D-, 
CD+, G-, H-, GH+; where different letters stand for different foods, “+” stands for the 
presence of an allergic reaction, and “-“ stands for the absence of an allergic reaction). These 
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filler trials were meant to provide a context that carries the following relational information: 
“the allergic effect of a food is reversed when the food is presented alone compared to when 
it is presented together with another food”. Importantly, during training, target cues were also 
presented. Some target cues always occurred alone (i.e., I+, J+, M-, N-) whereas other target 
cues were always presented in compound (i.e., KL-, OP+).  
On subsequent test trials, participants continued to make predictions but feedback was 
no longer provided. The crucial test trials were those in which the target cues were presented 
in ways not seen before (i.e., IJ, MN, K, L, O, and P). Participants who learned to make the 
correct predictions on the filler trials, also responded to the crucial test trials in line with the 
relational information that was implied by the filler trials. More specifically, these 
participants predicted the outcome less often for target cues that were previously paired with 
the outcome (i.e., on IJ, O, and P test trials that followed I+, J+, and OP+ training trials) than 
for target cues that were never paired with the outcome during training (i.e., MN, K, and L 
test trials that followed  M-, N-, and KL- training trials). According to propositional models 
of associative learning, participants used the relational information implied by the filler trials 
to form propositions about the relation between the test cues and the outcome. For instance, 
based on I+ and J+ trials, they formed the proposition that I and J together would not be 
followed by the outcome and therefore predicted that the compound IJ would not be followed 
by the outcome.   
 My colleagues and I replicated and extended these findings in a number of studies that 
were reported in two papers (De Houwer & Vandorpe, 2010; Zanon, Gast, & De Houwer, 
2010; see Wills, Graham, Koh, McLaren, & Rolland, 2011, for related studies). In a first 
study (De Houwer & Vandorpe, 2010), we found an impact of the relational information that 
was implied by the filler trials even when knowledge about the target-cue outcome relations 
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was assessed using an Implicit Association Test (IAT). The IAT is a reaction time task in 
which participants classify stimuli into one of four categories by pressing one of two keys. 
The basic idea behind the IAT is that classification performance should be superior when the 
categories assigned to the same key are somehow related in memory than when they are 
unrelated (see Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Because the IAT requires the use of 
four stimulus categories, we had to alter the design of Shanks and Darby (1998) slightly. 
Rather than having one outcome that could be present or absent, we paired cues with one of 
two possible outcomes. More specifically, cues were said to be chemical substances that 
could either result in nausea or skin irritation. In a first between-subjects condition (Condition 
Same), filler cues were followed by the same outcome independent of whether they were 
presented in isolation or in compound (i.e., A-O1, B-O1, AB-O1, C-O2, D-O2, CD-O2, 
where different letters refer to different chemical substances, O1 refers to the first outcome, 
and O2 refers to the second outcome). In a second condition (Condition Opposite), cues were 
followed by a different outcome when presented in isolation than when presented in 
compound (i.e., A-O1, B-O1, AB-O2, C-O2, D-O2, CD-O1). During training, participants in 
both conditions saw the target compound EH together with O1 and the target compound GH 
with O2.  
In Condition Same, the contextual relational information that was embedded in the 
filler trials allowed participants to infer that E would be followed by O1 when presented in 
isolation whereas G on its own would be followed by O2. Performance on the IAT confirmed 
that participants found it easier to respond when E and O1 were assigned to one key and G 
and O2 were assigned to the second key than when the key assignments were reversed (i.e., 
press one key for E and O2 and second key for G and O1). In Condition Opposite, however, 
the contextual relational information implied that E on its own would be followed by O2 and 
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G on its own by O1 even though participants actually experienced trials on which E was 
paired with O1 and G was paired with O2. In line with the prediction of propositional models, 
IAT performance showed that participants found it easier to relate E with O2 and G with O1 
than to relate E with O1 and G with O2. In sum, in Condition Opposite, associative learning 
did not reflect the actual target-cue pairings but the relational information that was embedded 
in the filler trials.  
In a recent set of studies, my colleagues and I showed that associative learning of 
evaluations can also be moderated by contextual relational information (Zanon, De Houwer, 
& Ga st, 2012). We implemented the same design as De Houwer and Vandorpe (2010) but 
used a positive and negative event as outcomes. More specifically, O1 corresponded to 
winning points whereas O2 corresponded to the loss of points. Hence, participants 
experienced events in which cue E co-occurred with winning (i.e., EF-win trials) and cue G 
co-occurred with losing (GH-loss trials). Across three different studies, we used three 
different reaction time measures that each provided an indirect index of how much 
participants liked the target cues E and G. In each study, we found that E was liked more than 
G in Condition Same. In Condition Opposite, however, no difference was found in the liking 
of E and G. Hence, the relational information provided by the filler trials moderated the 
impact of the stimulus pairings on the liking of the target cues. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
liking of E and G did not reverse in Condition Opposite provides a first indication that there 
are boundary conditions to the impact of contextual relational information on associative 
learning. The studies that are discussed in the next section shed some light on what those 
boundary conditions might be.  
Verbal Instructions as a Context 
  Propositional Learning
  
  
10 
 In the studies of Peters and Gawronski (2011), participants were asked to form an 
impression of four previously unknown persons based on information about the traits of these 
persons. Pictures of Persons A and B were most often presented together with positive trait 
words whereas pictures of Persons C and D were most often paired with negative trait words. 
Participants were told that the trait words gave a true description of Persons A and C (e.g., if 
Person A was paired with the word FRIENDLY, it implied that Person A was friendly) 
whereas Persons B and D possessed the traits that were opposite to those implied by the trait 
word (e.g., if Person B was presented with the word FRIENDLY, it implied that Person B 
was unfriendly). After this training phase, evaluations of the four target persons were 
assessed using both evaluative ratings and two indirect measurement tasks (i.e., the 
evaluative priming task and the affect misattribution task) that were designed to assess 
automatic evaluations (i.e., evaluative responses that were evoked by the target persons very 
quickly and even though this was not required by the task at hand; see De Houwer, 
Gawronski, & Barnes-Holmes, in press). If changes in liking are merely a function of actual 
stimulus pairings, one would expect that participants like Persons A and B more than Persons 
C and D, regardless of the relational information that was presented. Whereas Person A was 
indeed liked more than Person C, results showed that Person B was liked less than Person D, 
even though B was paired with positive stimuli whereas C co-occurred with negative stimuli. 
One might argue that the impact of contextual relational information on evaluative ratings is 
not particularly surprising given that participants had ample time to take into account the 
relational information provided by the instructions. It is important to note, however, that also 
automatic evaluations as captured by indirect measurement tasks were more negative for 
Person B than for Person D. 
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 In their third study, Peters and Gawronski (2011) discovered that the impact of verbal 
relational information depends on the time at which this information presented. If participants 
were told before the training phase which person-trait pairings were true and which should be 
reversed, then both the evaluative ratings and the automatic evaluations were in line with the 
relational information (i.e., A liked more than C but B liked less than D). If, however, 
participants first saw all person-trait pairings and were told only afterwards which pairings 
presented true information and which should be reversed, then automatic evaluations were 
influenced less by the relational information than evaluative ratings. More specifically, 
whereas participants rated A as more positive than C and B as less positive than D, automatic 
evaluations revealed a preference for A over C but no difference in the evaluation of B and D. 
This finding also sheds some light on the results of Zanon et al. (2012) that were described in 
the previous section. They also found that contextual relational information eliminated but 
did not reverse the effect of stimulus pairings on automatic evaluations. The lack of a reversal 
might have been due to the fact that the relational information was carried by the filler trials 
which were scattered throughout the learning phase. Hence, the relational information 
probably became available only after at least some target-outcome pairings were presented.  
 In a conceptual replication of the third study of Peters and Gawrsonki (2011), my 
colleagues and I repeatedly paired one neutral nonword (e.g., LOKANTA – HAPPY) with an 
existing positive word and a second neutral nonword with an existing negative word (e.g., 
FEVKANI – UGLY; Zanon, De Houwer, Gast, & Smith, in press, Experiment 1). Either 
before or after the pairings, participants were told that the nonwords were antonyms of the 
existing words, that is, that each nonword had the opposite meaning of the existing word with 
which it was paired. At the end of the experiment, automatic evaluations of the nonwords 
were captured using a version of the IAT. When the antonym instructions were presented 
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before the nonword-word pairings, the impact of the nonword-word pairings was reversed 
(i.e., participants liked the nonword that was paired with the positive word less than the 
nonword that was paired with the negative word). In line with the findings of Peters and 
Gawronski, the effect of the stimulus pairings was merely attenuated but not reversed when 
the antonym instructions was presented after the pairings. 
 In a second study (Zanon et al., in press, Experiment 2), we tested one possible 
explanation for why the impact of relational information depends on the time at which that 
information is presented. Given that in daily life, stimuli that are somehow similar tend to co-
occur more often than stimuli that are dissimilar, it might be the case that - in the absence of 
any other contextual relational information - the mere pairing of two stimuli is seen as a cue 
that those stimuli are somehow equivalent (see Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001, for a 
discussion of this assumption). For instance, when participants see a picture of an unknown 
person together with a trait word (as was the case in the studies of Peters and Gawronski, 
2011), they might infer that the trait word provides a true reflection of the properties of the 
depicted person. However, they will not draw these inferences if other relational information 
is available that contradicts the default assumption (e.g., the verbal message the persons 
possess the traits opposite to those implied by the trait words). When they receive this 
relational information only after the pairings, they can form new propositions about the target 
persons based on this new relational information but they cannot erase the propositions that 
they formed on the basis of the default assumption earlier on during the training phase. If one 
adds the final assumption that these initial propositions have a larger effect on automatic 
evaluations than on evaluative ratings (e.g., because the former are more difficult to control), 
one can explain the fact that relational information has less impact on automatic evaluations 
than on evaluative ratings if that information is presented only after the pairings.  
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 To test this idea, we presented verbal relational information both before and after the 
stimulus pairings. Participants could be told that the nonwords and words were either 
synonyms or antonyms, thus resulting in four conditions (i.e., synonym before and after, 
antonyms before and after, synonyms before and antonyms after, antonyms before and 
synonyms after). We also ran a condition in which verbal relational information was not 
provided, neither before nor after the pairings. As in earlier studies, we registered both 
evaluative ratings and automatic evaluations. In line with the account outlined above, 
automatic evaluations were influenced more strongly by the initial relational information than 
evaluative ratings. Moreover, results in the condition without any relational information were 
similar to those in the synonym-before-and-after condition, thus suggesting that in the 
absence of contradictory contextual relational information, mere stimulus pairings are seen as 
a cue for the equivalence of the paired stimuli.  
A Functional-Cognitive Analysis of the Empirical Evidence 
 The studies described above are firmly rooted in the cognitive tradition of learning 
research. Within this cognitive approach, the main aim is to uncover the mental mechanisms 
that mediate (associative) learning, that is, the mechanisms by which regularities in the 
environment produce changes in behavior. For instance, the studies listed above were 
designed primarily to evaluate propositional models of associative learning. However, from a 
functional-cognitive perspective (De Houwer, 2011), cognitive and functional research – 
although driven by fundamentally different objectives – can be mutually supportive. On the 
one hand, cognitive research produces new functional knowledge (i.e., new knowledge about 
the conditions under which behavioral effects occur). On the other hand, functional research 
constrains cognitive theories because it generates functional knowledge that cognitive 
theories should be able to explain. In other words, cognitive theories can inspire the discovery 
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of novel functional knowledge whereas functional research can provide additional input for 
the development of cognitive theories.  
The cognitive and functional approach can, however, interact only to the extent that 
there is a common language to describe the research that each approach generates. Elsewhere, 
my colleagues and I proposed that this common language can be found in the functional 
approach. Hence, we have argued that cognitive researchers can benefit from describing in 
functional terms the behavioral effects that they examine and the data they generate (De 
Houwer, 2011; De Houwer et al., 2013; De Houwer et al., in press). In this section, I will 
attempt to provide such a functional analysis of the cognitive studies that were described in 
the previous section. In doing so, I hope to clarify not only how this cognitive research 
contributes to the functional approach, but also how existing functional research can further 
constrain cognitive theories of associative learning. 
In functional terms, studies on the impact of contextual relational information provide 
additional evidence for a phenomenon known as context dependent relational responding. 
Consider the study by Steele and Hayes (1991). During a first training phase, participants 
were shown a sample stimulus (e.g., a short line) together with two comparison stimuli (e.g., 
a short line and a long line), one of which was physically identical to the sample. In the 
presence of a first arbitrary relational cue (a meaningless symbol; i.e., cue SAME), 
participants were reinforced for selecting the comparison stimulus that was identical to the 
sample (e.g., the short line) whereas in the presence of a second relational cue (another 
meaningless symbol; i.e., cue OPPOSITE), the selection of the other stimulus was reinforced 
(e.g., the long line). The fact that participants were able to respond in the desired way could 
be seen as an example of context dependent non-arbitrary relational responding. Participants 
responded relationally in that their choices were based not on the properties of one stimulus 
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as such (i.e., the identity of the short line) but on the relation between the identity of the 
sample and the identity of the comparison stimuli. Relational responding could have been 
non-arbitrary in that is was based on the physical properties of the stimuli. Most important for 
the present purposes, relational responding was context dependent in that a contextual cue 
(SAME or OPPOSITE) determined the type of relation that controlled the choices.  
The study of Steele and Hayes (1991) did not end there. During a second training 
phase, sample and comparison stimuli were arbitrarily selected such that they did not 
(systematically) share any physical resemblance. The stimuli were randomly assigned to 
different arrays and were denoted by a letter-digit code in which the letter referred to the 
array to which the stimulus belonged and the digit referred to the location of the stimulus 
within the array (e.g., stimulus B2 refers to the second stimulus in array B). Importantly, 
when cue OPPOSITE was present, participants were reinforced for selecting B3 from an 
array of comparison stimuli in the presence of A1 and for selecting C3 from another array of 
comparison stimuli in the presence of A1. When relational cue SAME was present, however, 
B1 and C1 had to be selected in the presence of A1. During the crucial test trials, participants 
saw B3 as a sample stimulus and C1 and C3 as comparison stimuli. In the presence of the 
relational cue SAME, participants selected C3 whereas in the presence of relational cue 
OPPOSITE, participants selected C1 even though participants had never been reinforced for 
making these choices. These results demonstrate that participants responded relationally (i.e., 
because the choices were not based merely on one stimulus but on the relation between the 
sample and comparison stimuli) in a way that was context dependent (because relational 
responding was dependent on the context cue) and based on arbitrary stimulus properties 
(because the stimuli did not share any systematic physical relation). This behavioral 
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phenomenon is commonly referred to as arbitrarily applicable relational responding (see 
Dymond & Roche, 2013, and Hayes et al., 2001, for relevant reviews).1 
The cognitive studies on the impact of contextual relational information that were 
described in the second section of this paper share important features with study of Steele and 
Hayes. Most importantly, responding in the cognitive studies was most likely relational in 
nature. Consider the study of Peters and Gawronski (2011) in which participants liked a 
person whose picture was paired with positive trait words unless the traits were said to 
describe the opposite of the person’s actual traits. In all likelihood, (evaluative) responding to 
the target person was not based merely on the properties of the target person, including the 
properties of the person that might have been changed as a result of the picture-trait pairings. 
If responding was non-relational, then why would relational cues (e.g., verbal instructions 
about the relation a person and the trait words it was paired with) have such a big impact on 
responding to the person? Likewise, in the studies of Shanks and Darby (1998; also see De 
Houwer & Vandorpe, 2010) the filler trials provide a relational context that specifies the 
functional relation between the consequences that follow single versus compound stimulus 
presentations (i.e., same outcome or opposite outcomes). When participants subsequently 
encountered novel stimuli during the test trials, responding to the test stimuli is relational in 
that it is controlled by this relational context.   
Of course, any functional analysis of any individual behavioral finding can be 
submitted to debate and further testing. With regard to our functional analysis of the results of 
1 Hayes et al. (2001) argued that once a person has developed the ability 
to respond relationally in an arbitrarily applicable manner, all types of 
(conditioned) responding would qualify as arbitrarily applicable relational 
responding, even those instances in which people seem to respond to non-
arbitrary properties of stimuli or stimulus relations. Hence, all types of 
(conditioned) responding should be sensitive to control by contextual 
relational cues.  
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Peters and Gawrsonki (2011), for instance, one could argue that the properties of the stimulus 
persons did somehow change as the result of the direct contingencies between the pictures 
and trait words and did so in a way that was modulated by the contextual relational cues. 
Assume, for instance, that a stimulus person acquires the valence that is implied by the 
contextual meaning of the trait word with which it is paired (e.g., the trait word “ happy” in 
the context of the relational cue “false” might be recoded as “sad”, thus leading to a disliking 
of persons paired with the trait word “happy”). Although this account implies context 
dependent relational responding to the trait word, the change in responding to the stimulus 
person might still be considered as non-relational (see Zanon et al., in press, for a discussion). 
One way to argue against such a non-relational account of the results of Peters and 
Gawronski would be to test whether the changes in evaluative responding to a person transfer 
to stimuli that were not paired with the trait words but that do participate in relation with that 
person (e.g., that the same changes occur for friends of that person but opposite changes 
occur for enemies of that person; see Smyth, Barnes-Holmes, & Forsyth, 2006, Valdivia-
Salas, Dougher, & Luciano, 2013, and Whelan & Barnes-Holmes, 2004, for more details 
about this approach). Regardless of the outcomes of this additional research, it seems at least 
reasonable to raise the possibility that cognitive studies on the impact of contextual relational 
information provide new evidence for the functional phenomenon of (arbitrarily applicable) 
relational responding. Moreover, cognitive studies could inspire functional researchers to 
engage in quasi-replications of these studies using training and testing methods that provide 
more control over the learning history that participants bring to bear during the experiment. 
In sum, cognitive research could contribute to the functional literature on associative learning 
in different ways.   
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By linking the cognitive studies on contextual relational information to the functional 
phenomenon of relational responding, it also becomes apparent that existing functional 
research on relational responding could be relevant for the development of cognitive theories 
of associative learning. In order to explain the fact that humans can respond on the basis of 
relations between stimuli and can do so in a context dependent manner, it seems necessary to 
assume that the cognitive mechanisms that mediate these behavioral effects somehow process 
information about the way in which stimuli are related. In other words, evidence for context 
dependent relational responding supports the hypothesis that propositions mediate associative 
learning. In any case, current or future cognitive theories of associative learning should be 
able to account for context dependent (non-arbitrary or arbitrarily applicable) relational 
responding. Because of the unfortunate divide between functional and cognitive approaches 
in psychology, this challenge has rarely if ever been addressed by cognitive models of 
associative learning. In sum, cognitive research on associative learning can benefit from 
venturing into the functional domain just like functional research can profit from cognitive 
research. 
Conclusion 
 As is evidenced by the papers reported in this special issue, the effects of context on 
associative learning have been studied extensively. The present paper highlights a number of 
studies on the impact of contextual relational information that were inspired by propositional 
models of human associative learning. From the perspective of propositional models, 
contextual relational information should play a vital role in associative learning because it 
shapes the propositions that are thought to mediate learning. Various studies confirmed that 
contextual relational information moderates associative learning, irrespective of whether 
relational information was embedded in other regularities or in verbal instructions. In some 
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cases, effects of stimulus pairings were even reversed as the result of the presence of 
contextual relational cues. These findings do not only support propositional models of 
associative learning but also contribute to the functional literature by providing new evidence 
for arbitrarily applicable relational responding. Vice versa, existing functional research on 
relational responding can inform cognitive research about the mental mechanisms that 
mediate associative learning. Research on the impact of contextual relational cues is thus 
likely to provide fertile common ground for both cognitive and functional scholars of 
associative learning. 
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